February 19, 2017, Salva Kirr’s Dinka government and army has finally get what it want, people are leaving Dinka government alone
February 19, 2017, Salva Kirr’s Dinka government and army has finally get what it want, people are leaving Dinka government alone
JUBA (19 Feb.)
South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir has issued an executive order forming a high-level committee to make the necessary preparations for relocation of the nation’s capital city from Juba to the newly proposed site in Ramciel.
Ramciel area lies at the centre of South Sudan and borders a number of states. The proposed national capital has no public utilities and physical infrastructure.
According to the order broadcast by the state-owned South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation (SSBC) on Thursday, President Kiir appointed the First Vice President, Taban Deng Gai, as the head of the committee.
The order also named Nhial Deng Nhial, senior presidential advisor and special envoy for diplomatic affairs, as deputy chairperson of the committee.
The committee members include the presidential advisor on legal affairs and constitutional development, Lawrence Korbandy, minister of finance, Stephen Dhieu Dau, minister in the office of the president, Mayiik Ayii Deng and minister of petroleum, Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth.
The order tasked the committee to recommend to the President what needs to be done and how preparations for the relocation of the capital city can be done.
File photo: Kiir addresses people in Yei town (Radio Tamazuj)
February 19, 2017, Africans Press received a secret message send out by SPLA’s spokesman Lul Ruach Koang that their force “has tactically withdraw from the town centre in Yuai in fear of bing locked in with no escape access”. he said
Lul says that they move to about 45 minutes in the bush where they will try to dig themselves in there. Stay tune
ANALYSISBy Fekadu Wubete
February 18, 2917 Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn had discussed with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi while here, in Addis Ababa for the 28th African Union (AU) Summit. The two leaders had held thoroughly discussion focusing on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and building mutual trust, confidence and strengthening their bi-lateral ties.
In their joint statement the two leaders stated that Ethiopia and Egypt had agreed to continue to work together to enhance the relations of the two countries. The two leaders had stressed the need to widen the scope of cooperation in the spheres of politics, economy and security.
The leaders underscored the importance to burgeon achievements gained so far in the area of leadership and bi-lateral tie and decided to enhance mutual confidence. The leaders indicated that they are closely following the trilateral technical talks regarding GERD and reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen spirit of cooperation and mutual benefit.
Besides, the two leaders had stressed the need to strengthen closer communication and continuation of consultations regarding the impact assessment of GERD and engagement of companies elected to this purpose.
It has been six years since the construction of GERD has been commenced. The nation is providing all information about the development of GERD to stakeholders and neighboring countries. This clearly shows how GERD is being constructed in an accountable and transparent manner. In light of this, the nation has emphasized the importance of cooperation by all Nile riparian countries for further regional development.
In the contrary, as a beacon of partisanship and best instance of anti-Ethiopian sentiment, for so many years until now the International River Network (IRN), self-appointed “guardian” of all rivers of the world, has been leaving no stone unturned to subvert Ethiopia’s efforts to develop its water resources and lift its vast and growing population out of poverty. This is manifested most glaringly in its incessant destructive campaign against the GERD initiated from the very first days when the idea of water resources development on the Nile was floated, including even through the Nile Basin Initiative.
It seems that the IRN wants to illegally and immorally sustain age-ravaged hegemony and colonial water treaty in the basin and entrench the Faustian colonial agreement of 1959 which allocated 18.5 and 55.5 billion m3 , between Sudan and Egypt respectively. Sticking to this colonial treaty, Sudan and Egypt had been opposing other upstream countries from undertaking development projects on Nile and implementing comprehensive agreements of equitable use of Nile water.
National Panel of Experts (NPoE) earlier stated that IRN is accuser, police, judge and jury all rolled into one. It determines for countries, particularly for developing and poor countries like Ethiopia, how to use water resources development projects in the “right” way. For these poverty-stricken countries, IRN has been high handedly and heavy handedly determining what is the most environmentally appropriate, most efficient and economical, and most beneficial for local, national and regional not only flora and fauna but also human communities too. What paternalism! What partisanship!
According to NPoE, by 2000 large scale dams were more than 40,000. As of 2006, they stood at over 50,000. Despite IRN’s campaigns, big dams are multiplying, especially in the developing world. So, given these trends, it is deplorable to see IRN throwing its singled out curse and attack on Ethiopia and discouraging its progress.
NPoE stressed that Ethiopia has endured centuries of invasions and subversion by powers from far and close that aspired to control the headwaters of the Nile. Ethiopia has been prevented physically from accessing its water resources by keeping it busy with wars, direct or proxy wars. IRN’s anti Ethiopia campaign is but a continuation of that history – by another means.
Absolutely, the stand of IRN has been an epitome of partisanship. Its opposition and publication of statements time and again proves ignorance and bias. Its ideas are unpalatable and unconscionable to common folk of Ethiopia, let alone professional Ethiopians well versed with water engineering and advising on GERD (any unsubstantiated and hostile propaganda against GERD and the Ethiopian people could not bring lasting benefit to the region as well).
Such inability to perceive reality, too much politicization and polarization, partisanship and negative report being made by numerous media institutions have been complicating the idea of utilizing Nile justifiably. Until now, the conflict angle has been overplayed, unbalanced and biased publication aggrandized by partizanship have been compounding the Nile impasse.
In this context, the opportunities and prospects of cooperation to use Nile to benefit all is totally neglected. And the absence of cooperation and shared management has been exacerbating challenges and threats of poverty and conflict to the inhabitants of Nile Basin.
Similarly, group mentality, intransigence and unheeding activity of self-professed journalists openly preaching to be radical nationalists is curbing free flow of unbiased information in the media out lets of the region. Hence, until recently, most of the discourse on the Nile has been dominated by reconstructive and egoistic national ambitions (likewise, some leaders reveal acute shortage of knowledge about the GERD and Nile. Their prime concerns have been political survival and short-term interest).
Amid this disparaging discourse, scholars advise, henceforth, the effort to employ Nile to justifiable benefit of all peoples of the Basin should be accompanied by basin-wide agenda and multi-national cooperation and management of Nile. And politicians should move the discourse of Nile and GERD from making it primarily political and security problem towards basin-wide benefit and wise resource management.
In addition, professional journalist are advised to focus on delving in to facts and counter balancing information and making it free from distortion, partisan bandwagon and red herring. Until now, considering the issue of Nile as predominant subject of national security has been worsening existing problem. Hence, every avenue should be explored for possible means and mechanisms to reconcile the irreconcilable and resolve contradiction between politicization and technicalization of Nile issues(indeed, no one denies the very fact that as home of over 400 million people, Nile could not be far from being political agenda and embellishment of talk of politicians).
In view of this very fact, researchers and academicians should cooperatively work with politicians in terms of deepening their understanding of the Nile and the GERD (and other regional issues as well). A growing and compelling body of research suggests that an urgent and coordinated action is needed to reverse the time-clawed and dangerous trend of Nile utilization (historical rights, acquired rights and established rights).
The media can inform the public about the short term and long term risks that the basin would face as long term strategist and farsighted developer. This way the media can play its critical role by exposing the risks in proceeding business as usual( not only for the present but also to the future generations as well).
The main role of the media should be providing balanced information to its audience. Its role is not different in the context of Nile Cooperation and the GERD. It should help Nile riparian and GERD discussants to enjoy meaningful participation and arrive at informed decision. The media shoulders extra responsibility due to the delicate nature of issues associated with trans-boundary rivers and its significance to affect many lives in numerous countries (national media outlets should on a regular basis inform, educate, inspire and mobilize the public about the benefit of Nile Cooperation, mutual benefits of mega projects like GERD and protecting the basin to lasting benefit).
Literally, the media can generate educated society and critically thinking generation. They can also help the creation of enlightened and bold leaders by mobilizing public support, influencing and shaping public opinion and perception through providing accurate information of the Nile and the GERD. The media can also highlight the comparative advantages to each country when implementing projects like GERD and how that can be exploited to mutual benefit.
Mass media could and should play constructive role by mobilizing the greater public in support of projects, so far as it has established benefit to the people of Nile Basin. Hence, media should critically investigate what is bane and boon to the public and harmonize its publication in line with its benefit to people.
Media is not expected to be shackled with partisanism. Hence, it is anticipated to publicize accurate and balanced information and set non-partisan agenda on Nile, GERD. Let the bygone, turbulent and embarrassing years of Nile utilization be history of dead fish that nobody likes to reckon. Let the future of Nile be superseded by history of cooperation and mutual benefit. To this end, the media is expected to preach peace, cooperation, mutual benefit and Nile management and protection to secure lasting benefit (media should not serve as trivial propaganda machine of politicians and publish unfounded stories; rather it should educate the public including policy-makers on what is real and beneficial).
Sisi and Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta held discussions at the State House in the country’s capital Nairobi with an aim of bolstering cooperation between their two states.
The two countries agreed to remove double taxation on imports in a bid to improve trade between the two countries, the Daily Nation reports.
“We have agreed to fast track and conclude our bilateral agreement on double taxation before the end of this year,” President Kenyatta said.
The decision means that goods from either countries will only be subjected to import duty.
President Kenyatta said this will boost tea exports to Egypt, for example, which used to be Kenya’s second largest importer, before the Arab Spring in 2011.
The two leaders also vowed to cooperate on the use of the Nile, a sticking issue between Egypt and riparian countries of the world’s longest river.
Months after the Pentagon said it wouldn’t use a controversial type of armor-piercing ammunition that has been blamed for long-term health complications, U.S. aircraft fired thousands of the rounds during two high-profile air raids in Syria in November 2015, the Pentagon acknowledged Wednesday.
The use of the ammunition, a 30mm depleted-uranium bullet called PGU-14, was first reported by a joint Air Wars-Foreign Policy investigation on Tuesday. The roughly 5,265 rounds of the munition were fired from multiple A-10 ground attack aircraft on Nov 16, 2015, and Nov. 22, 2015, in airstrikes in Syria’s eastern desert that targeted the Islamic State’s oil supply during Operation Tidal Wave II, said Maj. Josh Jacques, a U.S. Central Command spokesman.
When loaded with depleted-uranium bullets, the A-10s fired what is called a “combat-mix,” meaning the aircraft’s cannon fires five depleted-uranium rounds to one high explosive incendiary bullet.
The strikes, which involved 30mm cannon fire, rockets and guided bombs, destroyed more than 300 vehicles, mostly civilian tanker trucks, the Pentagon said at the time. The two incidents were championed by the Pentagon, and footage of trucks being destroyed was posted online. The Pentagon said that no civilians were present during the bombardment because fliers had been dropped before strafing runs warning those in their trucks to flee.
Before the November strikes, the Pentagon said it would not use depleted-uranium munitions in the campaign against the Islamic State. In response to a query from a reporter in February 2015, Capt. John Moore, a spokesman for the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition in Iraq and Syria said in an email that “U.S. and Coalition aircraft have not been and will not be using depleted uranium munitions in Iraq or Syria during Operation Inherent Resolve.”
Later that year, the Pentagon’s stance toward depleted uranium changed. As U.S.-led forces ramped up their campaign to go after the Islamic State’s cash flow, U.S. planners for Operation Tidal Wave II decided that depleted-uranium ammunition would be the most effective weapon for targeting hundreds of Islamic State oil trucks in the Syrian desert. Jacques said that U.S. forces wanted to ensure that trucks would be rendered completely inoperable, adding that depleted-uranium rounds were the best way to achieve that, rather than the A-10’s standard high explosive cannon rounds. Typically, depleted-uranium rounds are used on armored vehicles, such as tanks and troop transports, and there is no international treaty or rule that explicitly bans their use.
“Given the international opprobrium associated with the use of depleted uranium, we had been pretty astonished to hear that it had been used in operations in Syria,” said Doug Weir, the International Coordinator for the Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons. “The U.S. consistently states that the weapons are for anti-armor use, although their record from Iraq … was further evidence that this doesn’t really bear close scrutiny.”
Depleted uranium is the byproduct of the enriched uranium needed to power nuclear reactors. Depleted uranium is roughly 0.7 times as radioactive as natural uranium, and its high density makes it ideal for armor-piecing rounds such as the PGU-14 and certain tank shells. Depleted uranium is also used to reinforce certain types of armor and has a number of nonmilitary uses, such as ballast in ships.
Whether exposure to depleted uranium causes adverse health effects has been debated. When it was used during the 1999 NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo, the United Nations advised that children stay away from the impact zones. The Iraqi government has also routinely stressed the danger the munitions pose to its people, soil and air. Depleted-uranium rounds were used in the hundreds of thousands of attacks during the 1991 Persian Gulf War and again in the opening salvos of the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
In a 2014 United Nations report on depleted-uranium munitions, the International Atomic Energy Agency said that “the existence of depleted-uranium residues dispersed in the environment, when observed as confined contamination of soils, vegetables, water and surfaces, does not pose a radiological hazard to the local populations.” The agency did say, however, that direct contact with larger amounts of depleted uranium through the handling of scrap metal, for instance, could “result in exposures of radiological significance.”
Jacques did not rule out the possibility that the U.S.-led coalition might use depleted-uranium rounds again, adding that the locations where they were used in November 2015 have been marked for cleanup in the future. Sanitizing the areas where the ammunition was fired might prove difficult, however, as the area is still primarily controlled by the Islamic State, and whatever scrap was left behind from the strikes has likely been recovered and sold.
February 17, 2017
U.S engineered “A traditional military coup against Kiir seems unlikely, although the old maxim of &never say never8 applies”
Classified By: CG Juba R. Whitehead, Reason: Section
1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) Summary: The Sudan People,s Liberation Movement (SPLM) has become the dominant single political movement in Southern Sudan, and the potential genesis of a one-party state. The July 2005 death of John Garang and the formation of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) have given the SPLM opportunities to bring rivals and former adversaries into the fold. The enlargement process has intensified factionalism within the SPLM )- by no means a new phenomenon — as the former inner circle of John Garang competes with a bloc coalescing around GoSS President and SPLM Chairman Salva Kiir, and a smaller faction headed by Riek Machar. GoSS President and SPLM Chairman Salva Kiir,s commitment to consensus has kept the situation in check, although internal tensions remain. Presidential Advisor Malwal reportedly leads a sub-faction within Kiir,s group that was a major factor in the agitations between Kiir and Garang faction. Malwal,s influence over Kiir now seems to be on the decline, to the satisfaction of the Garangists. The following paragraphs chart alliances and internal dynamics. End summary. ———— SPLM Rampant ————
(C) The formation of the GoSS further strengthened the position of the SPLM, which is largely synonymous with the GoSS. With jobs, patronage, and ) most importantly ) a large infusion of resources at its disposal, the SPLM has consolidated its position as the de facto single dominant party of the South. GoSS ministers from the National Congress (NCP) and other smaller parties have cooperated with their putative SPLM partners; in fact, a number of NCP supporters have defected to the SPLM. USAP, the only other political grouping that can claim even limited support throughout the South, has also fallen into line. Perhaps out of fear of renewed conflict, perhaps due to collective mistrust of the North, the South is more politically unified, and the SPLM more powerful, than it has been in fifteen years. ——————————————— – In Place of Inter-Party Politics, Factionalism ———————————————
—— 6. (C) The Garang faction enjoys the broadest base of any SPLM faction, but it is also the only faction that still pays lip service to Garang,s vision of a unified Sudan, a concept that is unpopular with a majority of Southerners. As the NCP is increasingly blamed by the GoSS for the laggardly pace of CPA implementation, the Garang faction appears to shifting its stance to support unity only if CPA implementation proceeds. No clear-cut leader has yet emerged within the faction to replace John Garang; his widow Rebecca, SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum, and GoSS Minister of Regional SIPDIS Cooperation Nhial Deng Nhial appear the most likely candidates. A brief sketch of major members of the Garang faction follows. — Rebecca Garang: A Dinka Bor, Rebecca reportedly influenced her late husband,s decisions on whom to advance, or impede, within the SPLM. Opinions are split over her qualifications or ability to seek or manage SPLM leadership. Her stewardship of SPLM finances during the war is frequently raised. She favors a secular, unified Sudan. — Pagan Amum Okich: A Shilluk from near Malakal with royal antecedents, he recently replaced Riek Machar as number two in the SPLM hierarchy. The charismatic Amun was one of Garang,s most trusted insiders. He is close to both Rebecca and Nhial Deng. He espouses unity, but not with the vigor of Garang. Noted SPLM lawyer Ghazi Suleiman recently commented to an embassy official that Amum would be a great leader, except he is &too short and too Shilluk
.8 — Nhial Deng Nhial: A Dinka from Tonj, Bahr el Ghazel, Nhial was a chief negotiator of the CPA. He is highly respected with the SPLM and viewed by many as the de facto leader of the Garang faction, although he has done little to reach out in the public. He supports the unity of Sudan, but only if the North respects full implementation of the CPA. — Paul Mayom Akec: The GoSS Presidential Advisor for Legal Affairs, he a Dinka from Rumbek. — Edward Lino Abyei: An Ngok Dinka from Abyei, Lino was the long-time head of SPLA external security and intelligence, and as such was feared and disliked by many. He was close to Garang, but has reportedly shifted toward Kiir, possibly in hope of being named Governor of Abyei. Separatists accuse him of being pro-North. — Gen. Kual Manyang Juuk: A Dinka Bor from Bor town related to John Garang, he is GoNU Minister of Transport, Roads and Bridges. He once espoused unity, but has reportedly sought closer ties with Kiir. — Elijah Malok: A Dinka Bor and the uncle of John Garang, Malok is Deputy Governor of the Central Bank and Governor of the Bank of Southern Sudan. His appointment to that position by Garang caused great consternation in the SPLM; many are surprised that he remains in place — Gen. Oyai Deng Ajak: A Shilluk from Upper Nile, he is currently Chief of Staff (COS) of the SPLA. He is married to Garang,s daughter. Deng frustrated Kiir,s attempt to move him from the COS slot to Minister of SPLA Affairs. — Maj. Gen. Salva Matok Deng: He is SPLA A/COS for Administration. He is a Dinka from Bahr el Ghazel who does not support Kiir. –
Yassir Sa,id Arman: The former spokesman of the SPLM is from Gezira, in North Sudan, one of the relatively few &Arabs8 in the SPLM. Formerly a member of Garang,s inner circle, he favors unity and the concept of the New Sudan. — Malik Aggar Ayar: From the small Ingasana tribe of Southern Blue Nile, he is currently Minister of Investment in the GoNU. Aggar was critical of Kiir,s initial perceived concessions to the North, but has reportedly moved closer to Kiir. He is said to favor unity because he knows that with separation, Southern Blue Nile would end up in the North. — Michael Makwei: A Dinka Bor, Makwei is Minister of Legal Affairs. He is close to both Nhial Deng and Pagan Amum but has reportedly moved away from Rebecca and toward Kiir. Recent comments indicate that he is increasingly leaning toward separation due to the North,s stalling tactics on the CPA. — Other members of the Garang faction are GoSS Information Minister Samson Kwaje (Fajalla) and Public Service Minister David Deng Athorbei (Dinka from Yirol). Speaker of the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly James Wani Igga, a Bari, has distanced himself from the Garang faction and toward Kiir, partly because of his ambitions in Equatoria, and partly because of his preference for secession. ——————————————— ————– Kiir Faction: Broad SPLA, Ethnic Support; Favors Secession ——————————————— ————–
(C) The Kiir faction enjoys support among the Dinka in the northwest, especially the Rek and Malual, and from Bahr el Ghazel. Kiir also draws support from the Fertit and Zande — the latter because of conflicts with displaced Dinka Bor in Zande lands in Western Equatoria State ) and, increasingly, the Nuer from Upper Nile. The SPLA rank and file as well as many junior and mid-level officers support Kiir, who is perceived more as soldier than politician. In the 2004 confrontation in Rumbek, fifty SPLA commanders reportedly sided with Kiir, and four with Garang.
(C) As First Vice President of the GoNU, President of the GoSS and titular head of both the SPLA and the SPLM; Kiir is indisputably the most powerful person in Southern Sudan today. Kiir,s position on Southern secession — which he privately favors ) is popular with most southerners. He is also the least divisive SPLM leader in ethnic terms: he satisfies the ambitions of the plurality Dinka groups that form the core of the SPLM without raising the specter of Dinka Bor hegemony that troubled other ethnic groups during Garang,s tenure. Most observers think that the Garang faction will nonetheless challenge Kiir,s control of the SPLM, although not necessarily his leadership of the GoSS. Members of Garang,s faction have told Embassy officials that they have no problem following Kiir, but they were worried about the influence exercised by Presidential Advisor Bona Malwal. Malwal,s influence is reportedly waning as Kiir accedes to the demands of the Garangists. 10. (C) Kiir is well respected in the South, but he does not have the large coterie of powerful followers in the political class or the popular adulation formerly accorded to Garang. The following individuals number among Kiir,s chief supporters. —
Remy Oller Itorong: A Latuka born in Torit in 1944, he is Deputy Speaker of the Council of States. He lived in Khartoum for many years and has limited influence in the South. He leans toward secession. — Dr. Justin Yac: A Dinka from Bar el Ghazel, as GoSS Minister of Cabinet Affairs, Yac is arguably the most influential force in day-to-day governance. Yac was SPLM Minister of Health and the one-time head of the SRRC until a falling out with Garang, reportedly over accusations of corruption. He is close to Kiir, but anathema to the Garang faction. He is said to favor separation. — Bona Malwal: The Minister of Information and Culture under President Nimeiri in the 1970s, Malwal is Dinka Twic. A controversial figure in the South due to his Northern connections, he is now a Presidential Advisor to President Bashir.
The influence Malwal exercises over Kiir, a source of great concern for the Garang faction, seems to be lessening, and Malwal recently denigrated Kiir,s leadership in front of a U.S. diplomat. Malwal reportedly favors unity. — Albino Akol Akol: A Gogrial Dinka from Bahr el Ghazel, he was a professional army officer in the SAF and was affiliated with SANU and the Southern Front. As the GoSS Minister of Industry, Mining and Industry, he is involved in the all-important petroleum portfolio. Akol leans toward secession if CPA implementation is not respected. — Anthony Lino Mukana: A Zande from Yambio, Makana is GoSS Minister of Commerce, Trade and Supply. A former SPLA commander, he leans toward secession. — Maj. Gen. Obutu Mamur Mette: A Latuka from Torit, he is the A/COS of Political Orientation and a member of the JDB. Mamur is the highest-ranking long-time SPLA officer supportive of Kiir, but he reportedly refused to support a rumored Kiir plot to mutiny against Garang. He seems to favor separation.
— Maj. Gen. Paul Malong Awan: A Dinka from Bahr el Ghazel, he was COS of the SPLA 3rd Front in Upper Nile. A Garang dissident and strong supporter of Kiir, he now ensures the personal security of the GoSS President. — Gen. Thomas Cirilo: A Bari from Equatoria, he commands SPLA forces committed to the JIU. — Aleu Ageing Aleu: A Dinka from Bahr el Ghazel, he joined the SPLA in the 1980s and is now State Minister of the Interior in the GoNU. His views on secession/unity are not known. — Paolino Matiep: A Nuer, he was bitterly opposed to John Garang. Kiir surprised the North by convincing Matiep to rejoin the SPLM and bring with him the majority of SSDF fighters under the terms of the Juba Declaration of early 2006. With Matiep moved to the newly created number two position in the SPLA chain of command, Kiir has strengthened his base with the Nuer of Upper Nile, to the detriment of Riek Machar. — Mary Kiden Wani: A Kuku from Equatoria known for her objectivity, the Minister of Gender and Social Welfare has gravitated toward Kiir. –
(C) The third SPLM faction is headed by GoSS Vice President Riek Machar, a much traveled veteran of southern politics who has cycled in and out of the SPLM. A Nuer from Western Upper Nile, Machar was founder or co-founder of Southern Sudan Democratic Forum, Coordinating Council of South Sudan, and United Democratic Sudanese Forces. Machar,s ambition to lead Southern Sudan is not a secret to anyone, but his frequent switch of allegiances during the war and his signature of the Khartoum Peace Agreement with the National Islamic Front in 1997 alienated many Southerners.
(C) Matiep,s alliance with Kiir has reduced Machar,s influence among Machar,s traditional Nuer constituency. Machar has recently sought to bolster his profile by pursuing a series of reconciliation initiatives and by traveling to Nuer areas in the company of Matiep. Pagan Amum,s ascension to Secretary General of the SPLM has somewhat reduced Machar,s influence there. Machar normally pursues his own self-interest by seeking alliances of convenience. He initially worked closely with Kiir, but is believed to be gravitating more toward Rebecca Garang in recent months. Once a proponent of separation, Machar has recently gone mute on this issue. The following politicians support him: –
(C) In contrast to Garang, Kiir cultivates a leadership style of consensus and compromise. While Kiir does not have the stature or popular mandate of Garang in the South, he has not been a polarizing force. Kiir,s expansion of the Politburo and elevation of Pagan Amum to the number two slot is a good example of his conciliatory style. Kiir,s willingness to reach out to rivals has helped calm internal turmoil within the SPLM, although tension remains as the Garang faction seeks to regain the status that it collectively and individually enjoyed under the leadership of Garang. Kiir initially maintained good relations with Machar, but there are indications that Machar has pulled back and is seeking to work more closely with Rebecca Garang to prevent Kiir from solidifying his grip on power. A SPLM Minister privately remarked that Kiir, who is frequently outside of the South, has been increasingly unable to control Machar.
(C) John Garang,s dominating and autocratic style may have allowed him to succeed as both the First Vice President in the GoNU and the President of the GoSS. The two positions, however, are not a good fit for Kiir,s inclusive, consultative style. When he is in Juba serving as the GoSS President, he is largely unable to influence actions in the GoNU, and when he is in Khartoum, the factions of the SPLM, most notably Machar, use the opportunity to solidify and increase their power. ———————————– Internal Dynamics and Looking Ahead ———————————–
(C) While verbal sniping takes place between factions behind closed doors, most observers of the southern scene do not expect imminent seismic upheaval within the SPLM. The three main factions have circled the wagons out of necessity due to the belief that the common adversary remains in the North, and the understanding that delivering the peace dividend to the population must be the SPLM,s top priority if it is to maintain its popular appeal. For now, at least, politics have taken a back seat to governance.
(C) A traditional military coup against Kiir seems unlikely, although the old maxim of &never say never8 applies. A few supporters of the Garang faction in the senior ranks of the SPLA reportedly still harbor animosity over Kiir,s 2004 challenge to Garang, but there is no indication of serious plans to use force to topple Kiir. A far more likely scenario for instability would be a spontaneous military mutiny at some SPLA garrison sparked by GoSS/SPLM failure to pay salaries, to improve training and physical conditions in which soldiers live, and to maintain discipline in the ranks.
(C) Machar is expected to contest SPLM leadership with Kiir at the next SPLM congress, but senior members of the Garang faction may be prepared to bide their time and challenge Kiir,s control of SPLM mechanisms rather than his leadership. Upcoming events will help gauge where the fault lines run, and how far various factions are willing to push. The SPLM Politburo meeting in early April featured Pagan Amum acting for the first time as second in rank to Kiir in his role as SPLM Secretary General (SG). As the SG, Amum is responsible for convening the SPLM party congress by the end of the year, potentially as early as May but more likely later. During the recent meeting (reftel), factional in-fighting seemed to be kept to a minimum. While the Garang faction will continue to strive for increased control of the levers of power, smart money has it that Kiir will remain the party,s chosen leader, and not just the custodial heir of John Garang. STEINFEL
February 18, 2017, things are getting hot in Juba. last week Lt. Thomas Cirillo’s resignation, the duty chief of staff for legalistic. Then, yesterday was Duop Lam, the minister of Labour & public serves and LLb Khalid Ono Loki the Advocate Justic offer for Military justice. Today is Gen. Henry oyai’s official resignation, the military Justice’s director
All isted tribal humiliation to other tribe men by Salva Kirr’s Dinka officers
February 18, 2017
I’m glad to inform you, the 8th 2017 AFCOP ANNUAL MEETING will take place in Dakar from 20 to 22 February 2017 in Radisson Blu. A press conference will be hold on Monday 20.02 at 10am in presence of :
140 personalities coming from all Africa attempt to Dakar in order to :
In addition, please find below some usefull links :
o GERARDINE MAHORO, G.MAHORO@afdb.org
o ATTIEBAN, STEPHANE TUHAULT, S.ATTIEBAN@AFDB.ORG
ADI Sénégal sa
Imm. Clairafrique, Rue Malenfant
BP 23400 Dakar Ponty
Tél. : +221 33 889 92 91
Mob. : +221 77 229 42 71